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ABSTRACT
Commodity prices play an important role in 
economic developments in most of the 24 
Western and Central African (WCA) countries 
covered in this paper. It is confirmed that in the 
light of rising commodity prices between 1999 
and 2005, net oil exporters recorded strong 
growth rates while net oil-importing countries 
– albeit benefiting from increases in their major 
non-oil commodity export prices – displayed 
somewhat lower growth. For most WCA 
economies, inflation rates appear less affected 
by commodity price changes and more 
determined by exchange rate regimes as well as 
monetary and fiscal policies. While pass-
through effects from international to domestic 
energy prices were significant, notably in oil-
importing countries, second-round effects on 
overall prices seem limited. Governments of 
oil-rich countries reacted prudently to windfall 
revenues, partly running sizable fiscal surpluses. 
A favourable supply response to rising spending 
as well as sterilisation efforts and increasing 
money demand also helped to dampen 
inflationary pressures. However, substantial 
excess reserves of commercial banks reflect 
challenges in financial sector developments 
and the effectiveness of monetary policy in 
many WCA countries. Given currently widely-
used fixed exchange rate regimes, fiscal policy 
will continue to carry the main burden of 
macroeconomic adjustment and of sustaining 
non-inflationary growth, which remains the key 
policy challenge facing WCA authorities. 
JEL classification: Q33, O23, O24, O55
Keywords: Africa, commodity prices, monetary 
policy, fiscal policy5
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Commodities play an important role in the 
economies of most of the 24 countries in 
Western and Central Africa (WCA), which 
derive the majority of their merchandise export 
revenues from one single commodity or several 
commodities. 
Against the background of rising commodity 
prices, most WCA economies developed 
favourably between 1999 and 2005, although 
differences between net oil-exporting and 
importing countries were apparent. Net oil 
exporters recorded the highest growth rates, 
mainly supported by rising investment and 
exports on the back of record oil prices and an 
expanding oil sector in some countries. Net oil-
importing countries displayed lower growth, 
which was largely driven by domestic factors, 
most notably private consumption. Rising oil 
prices placed a burden on WCA economies, often 
counteracting benefits accruing from rising prices 
for their own main export products.
For most WCA countries, inflation rates seem to 
have remained relatively unaffected by changes 
in commodity prices. The exchange rate regimes 
of individual countries and their respective 
monetary and fiscal policies emerged as the 
determining factors in inflation developments.
Focusing on the inflationary impact of oil price 
developments, pass-through effects from 
international to domestic energy prices were 
significant in all countries, notably oil importers. 
Oil exporters experienced a comparably lower 
degree of pass-through, possibly reflecting the 
more widespread use of oil price subsidies. 
While this first-round effect of increased energy 
prices in WCA countries can be quantified as 
substantial, the limited availability of more 
detailed economic data make it difficult to 
analyse possible second-round effects. However, 
relatively contained inflation rates suggest that 
the impact of such second-round effects on the 
overall price level seems limited. 
At the same time, governments of oil-rich 
countries reacted quite prudently to the windfall 
revenues from higher oil prices. Although 
spending increased substantially, the budget 
position improved markedly in several countries, 
with some countries running sizeable fiscal 
surpluses. Moreover, the response of domestic 
supply to the rise in private and public spending 
was favourable, while global markets were easily 
able to provide goods and services as demonstrated 
by the rapid rise in imports of WCA countries. 
Finally, sterilisation efforts and an increase in 
money demand helped to dampen inflationary 
pressures that could arise from strong capital 
inflows associated with a rise in liquidity.
Sustaining non-inflationary growth in an 
environment characterised by high commodity 
prices remains the key policy challenge facing 
WCA authorities. Since almost all countries 
operate either a fixed exchange rate regime or a 
managed float, there is little room for an active 
monetary policy helping to fight inflationary 
pressures. Indeed, central banks are likely to 
continue intervening in foreign exchange markets 
to counteract appreciation pressures. Moreover, 
substantial excess reserves of commercial banks 
– while dampening money and credit growth in 
the short term – indicate that financial sector 
developments in many WCA countries represent 
an additional challenge. This challenge needs to 
be met in order to channel capital inflows towards 
productive uses and to enable central banks to 
manage liquidity more effectively in the context 
of large capital inflows. 
Given currently prevailing exchange rate 
regimes, fiscal policy will continue to carry the 
main burden of ensuring sustainable, non-
inflationary growth, taking into account the 
specific conditions of countries highly dependent 
on commodity price developments. Moreover, 
given the uncertainty of the nature of the 
commodity price shock, in particular whether it 
is a temporary or permanent shock, fiscal policy 
is called upon to target spending at enhancing 
the productive capacities of the economies, in 
particular their ability to diversify away from 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
Commodities play an important role in the 
economies of most of the 24 countries in 
Western and Central Africa (WCA),1 which 
derive the majority of their merchandise export 
revenues from a single commodity or several 
commodities. Against this background, this 
paper reviews the impact of recent commodity 
price developments on monetary and fiscal 
policy in the region. It is structured as follows: 
Section 2 provides an overview of past and 
recent commodity price cycles, highlights the 
significance of commodity production for the 
24 WCA countries and presents their economic 
development in the light of these findings. 
Section 3 is aimed at analysing why the impact 
of oil price developments on inflation in WCA 
countries has been limited, distinguishing 
between oil-exporting and oil-importing 
countries in the region. The analysis focuses on 
three channels through which rising oil prices 
could have affected inflation in the region: (1) 
the pass-through channel from international 
to domestic energy prices; (2) the spending 
channel, i.e. an increase in private or government 
spending, reflecting strong GDP growth and a 
rise in government revenues; and (3) the 
liquidity channel, i.e. the impact of strong 
capital inflows on foreign exchange reserve 
accumulation and excess liquidity in the 
banking sector. Section 4 summarises the main 
conclusions of the analysis and lists key 
challenges facing WCA authorities in sustaining 
non-inflationary growth in an environment 
characterised by high commodity prices. 
2  COMMODITY PRICES AND ECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENTS IN WESTERN AND CENTRAL 
AFRICA
2.1 COMMODITY  PRICE  DEVELOPMENTS
Since the late 1990s, commodity prices have 
followed an upward trend, with the prices of 
metals and crude oil showing the most 
pronounced increases. Although booms in 
commodity prices could be observed previously, 
the magnitude of the increase, its duration and 
its breadth are unparalleled compared with 
other upswings in the past 25 years. Notably, 
prices for all commodity groups2 have risen 
simultaneously since 2002, a pattern which 
cannot be detected for such a prolonged period 
any time since 1980 (see Charts 1 and 2).
Of the individual commodity groups, crude oil 
prices have increased more than fivefold, while 
metal prices have more than tripled since early 
1999. In both cases, this is the longest continuous 
rise since 1980. Prices have been driven mainly 
by growing demand from emerging markets, 
particularly China and India, encountering 
constrained supply conditions caused by past 
underinvestment in the wake of low or falling 
commodity prices. Moreover, geopolitical 
tensions have been contributing to high and rising 
prices, especially in the market for crude oil.
Price developments for agricultural products 
have been more subdued. Although prices for 
agricultural raw materials, food and beverages 
have been following an upward trend since 
late 2001, their respective gains of around 
30%, 50% and 70% are relatively moderate 
compared with non-agricultural commodities. 
Nevertheless, the current rise is the most prolonged 
for food and beverages in the last two and a half 
decades. Explaining the rise in agricultural product 
prices is less straightforward than for crude oil and 
metals. Excluding weather conditions, which can 
have a strong impact on these commodities, 
structural changes in food consumption patterns in 
developing economies or higher demand for cotton 
and wool from a nascent textile industry in 
emerging markets might be possible explanations 
for the observed trends.
1  Benin, Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African 
Republic, Chad, Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Democratic Republic of 
the Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon, The Gambia, Ghana, 
Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, 
Nigeria, São Tomé and Príncipe, Senegal, Sierra Leone and 
Togo.
2  Commodities can be classified into five groups, namely crude 
oil, metals (copper, aluminium, iron ore, tin, nickel, zinc, lead 
and uranium), agricultural raw materials (timber, cotton, wool, 
rubber and hides), food (cereals, vegetable oils, meat, seafood, 
sugar, bananas and oranges) and beverages (coffee, tea and 
cocoa).7
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2.2  THE SIGNIFICANCE OF COMMODITIES IN 
WESTERN AND CENTRAL AFRICA
Commodities play an important role in the 
economies of most of the 24 WCA countries, 
which derive the majority of their merchandise 
export revenues from one single commodity or 
several commodities (see Table 1). Countries 
with a dominant share of oil in their export 
revenues also appear to be highly dependent on 
oil regarding government revenues and GDP, 
with contributions of around 50% or above. By 
contrast, the direct contribution of agricultural 
products and other non-oil commodities to GDP 
and government revenues is considerably 
smaller. Thus, the significance of these 
commodities for the respective economies 
stems mainly from their importance as a source 
of foreign exchange revenue and their being 
responsible for the employment of large parts 
of the labour force, particularly in countries 
with mainly agricultural produce.3
Some of the WCA countries are not only 
important exporters of commodities, but also 
display sizeable commodity imports, notably 
petroleum-related products. 16 countries in the 
region4 are dependent on oil imports to satisfy 
their energy needs and are therefore negatively 
affected by the rise in oil prices.
As a result, WCA economies are highly 
susceptible to fluctuations in commodity prices, 
but the conclusion that their increase is 
beneficial per se appears to be premature. 
Indeed, while the prices for some of Western 
and Central Africa’s main export products, in 
particular aluminium, crude oil, gold, iron ore, 
rubber and uranium, have followed the recent 
price boom (see Chart 3), developments have 
been either more moderate or more volatile for 
other commodities (see Chart 4).5
Chart 1 Price developments of crude oil and 
metals, 1980-2006
(index, January 1980 = 100)











































Chart 2 Price developments of agricultural 
commodities, 1980-2006
(index, January 1980 = 100)




















































3  For other dimensions of commodity dependence, see Marinkov 
and Burger (2005). To explore the degree of volatility in 
commodity prices, they measure the standard deviation of their 
cyclical components. They also examine the elasticity of real 
exchange rates to changes in relative commodity prices as well 
as the direction of causality between commodity exports and 
GDP. 
4  Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, 
Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, 
Niger, São Tomé and Príncipe, Senegal, Sierra Leone, The 
Gambia, Togo.
5  Charts 2 and 3 reflect price developments of commodities that 
meet certain standardised specifications and qualities. A 
commodity produced by an individual country might not meet 
these criteria and thus might be subject to price levels and 
fluctuations different from those displayed in the charts. 
Nevertheless, underlying trends using different qualities and 
specifications are likely to be similar.
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Economies in which a single commodity is dominant
Chad oil 86.3 n.a. n.a.
Congo oil 88.4 49.2 3), 6) 69.8 3), 6)
Equatorial Guinea oil 98.9 92.7 5) 94.3
Gabon oil 84.1 85.5 4), 5) 54.0 4), 5)
Nigeria oil 87.5 48.2 4), 5) 82.6 4), 5)
Sierra Leone diamonds 83.0 3) n.a. 2.0 3), 6), 18)
Guinea Bissau cashew nuts 92.8 21.0 11.0 19)
Benin cotton 58.1 21.0 5), 9) n.a.
Burkina Faso cotton 71.5 4) 18.9 4), 5) ...
São Tomé and Príncipe cocoa 89.5 5) 13.3 4), 6), 7) n.a.
Liberia rubber 87.9 5) 21.2 n.a.
Economies in which several commodities from the same commodity group are dominant
Guinea Major commodities 85.7 17.0 18.3
 of  which:
  bauxite and alumina 63.1 4)
17.0 4), 15) 18.3 4)
 gold 22.6 4)
The Gambia Major commodities 86.9 21.8 n.a.
 of  which:
 groundnuts 65.4 4), 6) 8.9 4) n.a.
  fruit and vegetables 20.3 4), 6) 10.2 4), 14) n.a.
 fishing 1.2 4), 6) 2.7 4) n.a.
Economies in which several commodities from different commodity groups are dominant
Cameroon Major commodities 76.7 6.3 n.m.
 of  which:
 oil 49.6 4) 3.3 4), 5) 26.2 4)
  cork and wood 16.1 4) 1.9 4), 5), 8) n.a.
  cocoa beans, cocoa products 11.0 4) 1.1 4), 5), 12) n.a.
Central African Republic Major commodities 91.7 13.4 n.a.
  of which:
 diamonds 50.8 6.6 3), 5), 15) n.a.
  cork and wood 40.9 6.8 3), 5), 8) n.a.
Democratic Republic 
of the Congo
Major commodities 79.4 10.1 0.2
of which:
 diamonds 45.7 4), 5)
 oil 19.9 4), 5) 10.1 4), 5), 15) 0.2 4), 6)
 cobalt 13.8 4), 5)
Côte d’Ivoire Major commodities n.m. 12.6 19.2
of which:
  cocoa beans, cocoa products 35.8 3) 8.1 2), 5), 13) 17.8 2), 5), 21)
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Mali Major commodities 88.2 10.1 n.a.
of which:
 gold 52.8 4), 5) 7.0 4), 5), 15) n.a.
 cotton 35.4 4), 5) 3.1 4), 5) n.a.
Mauritania Major commodities 99.7 15.9 37.0
of which:
 iron  ore 59.8 4) 11.7 4), 15) ... 3)
 fish 39.9 4) 4.2 4) 37.0 4), 22)
Niger Major commodities 49.7 19.1 n.m.
of which:
 uranium 32.2 3) 6.1 3), 15) 4.2 3)
 cattle 17.5 3) 13.0 3), 11) n.a.
Ghana Major commodities 68.7 12.2 7.7
of which:
 cocoa 38.5 4), 6) 7.6 4), 10) 5.2 4), 23)
 gold 30.2 4), 6) 4.6 4), 16) 2.5 4), 24)
Sources: IMF, UN Comtrade and ECB calculations.
Note: Due to a lack of reliable data, Senegal and Togo are omitted; commodities do not comprise a significant share of merchandise 
exports in Cape Verde. n.a. = not available; n.m. = not meaningful; ... = zero or close to zero








9) agriculture and forestry






16) mining and quarrying
17) petroleum extraction and energy, including petroleum refining
18) sum of revenues from mining licenses, royalties and export duties
19) duties on cashew exports
20) taxes and exports taxes on cocoa and coffee
21) non-tax revenue from petroleum and gas
22) fishing royalties and penalties
23) export duty on cocoa
24) revenue collected from the mining sector 
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Cross-country differences in exposure to certain 
commodities and in terms of price developments 
imply that terms of trade changes have varied 
substantially for the countries under review 
(see Chart 5). Net oil exporters6 stand out as the 
main beneficiaries of the commodity boom, 
whereas the terms of trade of exporters of 
agricultural produce and, to a lesser extent, of 
non-oil commodities, have deteriorated. This 
reflects the fact that the rise in oil prices has 
been substantially stronger compared with most 
other commodities produced in the region (see 
Charts 3 and 4). Indeed, oil trade balances for 
the 16 net oil importers have worsened 
significantly since 1999. Correspondingly, most 
countries are spending a considerably higher 
amount of their import bill on oil than they did 
in 1999. Against this background, it is useful to 
distinguish between net oil exporters and 
importers when assessing the impact of 
commodity price fluctuations on the respective 
economies.
2.3   ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENTS IN WESTERN 
AND CENTRAL AFRICA
Growth rates across individual WCA economies 
varied considerably over the review period (see 
Chart 6), mainly reflecting differences in terms 
of commodity exposure and the impact of wars 
and civil strife on economic activity. The GDP 
of net oil exporters expanded by 6.2% annually 
between 1999 and 2005, whereas the average 
annual growth of net oil importers was 4.4%. 
Members of the CFA Franc Zone grew by 6.7% 
per year, with output in the West African 
Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) 
increasing by 3.2% per year, while the Central 
African Economic and Monetary Community 
Chart 3 Commodities with large price 
increases since 1999
(index, January 1999 = 100)








































6  Countries where exports of petroleum and petroleum products 
exceed imports of these products are classified as net oil 
exporters. In Western and Central Africa, Cameroon, Chad, 
Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, 
Equatorial Guinea, Gabon and Nigeria are net oil exporters. For 
Côte d’Ivoire and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, 
however, oil exports only slightly exceed oil imports. Their 
most important export commodities are not oil, but cocoa and 
diamonds respectively. Indeed, Côte d’Ivoire was the only net 
oil-exporting country to record a negative terms of trade change 
between 1999 and 2005.
Chart 4 Commodities with moderate price 
increases since 1999
(index, January 1999 = 100)
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(CAEMC), which includes five of the region’s 
eight net oil exporters, recorded a rise of 9.6% 
per year.7
The economic growth of net oil exporters 
appears to be linked to growth in oil production. 
Recently-established oil producers, like 
Equatorial Guinea and Chad,8 have displayed 
the highest growth rates in the region, with 
average annual GDP rising by 25.5% and 10.5% 
respectively between 1999 and 2005. As a 
mature oil exporter, Nigeria finds itself closer 
to the region’s average growth of 5.6% per 
year.9 Countries recording a decline in oil 
output (Cameroon, Congo, Gabon)10 are in the 
bottom half of the group, with Gabon’s economy 
even shrinking at an annual rate of 0.4%.
The growth performance of several countries 
was heavily influenced by wars and civil strife. 
The Democratic Republic of the Congo saw 
output increasing by only 1.2% per year, while 
economic activity in Côte d’Ivoire even declined 
by 0.2% annually. By contrast, Sierra Leone’s 
economy has rebounded after the end of 12 
years of civil war in 2002, growing at 8.8% per 
year over the review period.
Exporters of agricultural and other non-oil 
commodities recorded growth rates between 
0.1% (Central African Republic) and 5.5% 
(Burkina Faso). For these countries, no common 
trend based on their resource endowment can 
be identified. Generally, economies successfully 
implementing structural reforms, often under 
IMF-managed programmes (e.g. Burkina Faso, 
São Tomé and Príncipe), or benefiting from 
favourable developments in the agricultural 
sector (e.g. Ghana, The Gambia) display 
7  The CFA Franc Zone consists of the West African Economic and 
Monetary Union (WAEMU), comprising Benin, Burkina Faso, 
Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea Bissau, Mali, Niger, Senegal and Togo, 
and the Central African Economic and Monetary Community 
(CAEMC) with Cameroon, Chad, Central African Republic, 
Congo, Equatorial Guinea and Gabon.
8  Equatorial Guinea’s oil production has more than tripled since 
1999. Chad became a producer and exporter of oil as recently 
as 2003.
9  Nigeria’s oil production increased by around 25% between 1999 
and 2005.
10  Since 1999, the oil production of Cameroon, Congo and Gabon 
has declined by 39%, 14% and 31% respectively.
Chart 5 Terms of trade changes, 1999-2005
(percentages)
Sources: IMF and ECB calculations. 
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Chart 6 Real GDP growth, 1999-2005
(percentages; annual average)
Sources: IMF and ECB calculations. 
Note: Data for Liberia are unavailable.
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superior growth rates. Those facing domestic 
political instability (e.g. Guinea Bissau, Central 
African Republic) or those confronted with the 
fallout from conflicts in neighbouring countries 
(e.g. Guinea) show weaker growth.
Differentiating GDP by its components (see 
Chart 7) underlines differences in the economic 
structure between net oil exporters and 
importers in the region. For most oil-importing 
countries, private consumption made the largest 
contribution to GDP, ranging from 71.8% 
(Mali) to 94.9% (Sierra Leone) of GDP value 
added on average between 1999 and 2005. 
Across the eight net oil-exporting countries, 
this ratio was considerably lower at 58.9%. In 
Equatorial Guinea, where gross fixed capital 
formation constituted 54.5% of GDP, private 
consumption represented a mere 16.7%. By 
contrast, this ratio was 85.1% in Chad and the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo. Gross fixed 
capital formation played a larger role for net oil 
exporters (24.3% of GDP value added) than for 
net oil importers (20.1%), pointing to the higher 
Chart 7 Share of GDP components in 
aggregate GDP
(percentages; 1999-2005 average)
Sources: IMF and ECB calculations.
Note: Data for Liberia and Mauritania are unavailable.
private consumption
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capital intensity of oil-producing economies.11  
Public consumption was comparatively low in 
both groups, adding 10.4% and 14.6% to GDP 
in net oil-exporting and net oil-importing 
countries respectively, possibly reflecting a 
little developed government sector often facing 
severe constraints regarding the provision of 
public services (see also Section 3).12 Finally, 
the external sector contributed positively to 
GDP in most net oil-exporting countries (7.0%), 
while it was a negative factor (-17.6%) for all 
net oil importers, indicating their high 
propensity to imports to meet their domestic oil 
demand. Encouragingly, the external deficit 
was met by an expansion of investment in many 
economies instead of serving consumptive 
purposes.
Turning to growth rates of individual GDP 
components (see Table 2), the change in output 
for most net oil exporters has been largely 
driven by gross fixed capital formation and 
exports. Investment has outpaced GDP growth 
in five of the eight net oil-exporting economies. 
Only Côte d’Ivoire and Gabon have faced an 
annual contraction of gross fixed capital 
formation of 6.0% and 3.3% respectively. For 
Côte d’Ivoire, this likely mirrors the impact of 
prolonged conflict on investment, whereas 
declining oil production might have been the 
determining factor in Gabon. Exports have 
grown at a brisk pace of 26.7% and 29.1% 
annually in Equatorial Guinea and Chad, the 
two most recent oil producers in the region. The 
exports of the remaining countries in the group 
have risen more moderately. Only in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo have exports 
fallen, by 4.7% per year, which is striking, 
given the country’s potential as a commodity 
exporter in the light of its vast resource 
endowment. However, this development can 
probably be explained by the hostile investment 
environment lasting until the early 2000s. An 
11  The share of gross fixed capital formation in GDP value added 
of net oil-exporting countries ranged from 54.5% and 33.9% for 
the recently-established oil producers Equatorial Guinea and 
Chad to 11.3% and 5.3% in crisis-prone Côte d’Ivoire and the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo.
12  In the euro area, this ratio was 21.0% on average between 1999 
and 2005.13
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annual increase in private consumption above 
GDP growth could be observed in Nigeria 
(+7.3% p.a.) and Congo (+15.4% p.a.), whereas 
only in Nigeria has public consumption had a 
significant impact on GDP, growing 19.3% per 
annum.
In net oil-importing economies, the main drivers 
of GDP are more difficult to identify. Growth 
is fairly evenly spread across the different 
components of domestic demand, with private 
consumption taking a prominent role in many 
countries. Exports are expanding less rapidly 
than GDP in nine of the 16 net oil-importing 
countries, indicating the dependency of the 
group on domestic rather than foreign factors 
for economic expansion.
Cumulated balance of payment flows between 
1999 and 2005 (see Table 3) highlight the 
disparities between net oil exporters and 
importers in the region. Most net oil exporters 
recorded strong surpluses in their trade in 
goods, driven mainly by rising oil prices and, 
in the case of Chad, Equatorial Guinea and 
Nigeria, by increasing production volumes as 
well. In contrast, trade balances are negative for 
the majority of net oil importers, largely triggered 
by higher costs for their energy imports. 
Net oil exporters’ positive merchandise trade 
balances were offset and in some instances 
exceeded by significantly negative services and 
income balances, mainly reflecting the import 
of know-how (e.g. drilling services) and the 
repatriation of foreign oil companies’ profits 
(see Box 1). As a result, the current account 
balances of four countries in this group were in 
deficit, most prominently in Equatorial Guinea 
and Chad, which significantly expanded their 
oil output over the review period. Nevertheless, 
these deficits were comfortably covered by 
sizeable inflows of foreign direct investment, 
accompanied by current and capital transfers13 



















Equatorial Guinea O 25.5 1.7 5.5 -0.1 26.7 5.0
Chad O 10.5 4.3 16.3 7.0 29.1 15.2
Nigeria O 5.0 7.3 14.7 19.3 3.2 11.3
Cameroon O O 3.9 3.6 7.2 6.9 5.1 8.3
Congo O 3.6 15.4 21.1 3.7 1.1 16.5
Democratic Republic 
of the Congo O O 1.2 1.2 11.6 -1.0 -4.7 -3.3
Côte d’Ivoire O O -0.2 -1.0 -6.0 2.7 2.3 -1.4
Gabon O -0.4 -3.3 -3.3 -1.6 3.2 -0.8
Sierra Leone O 8.8 9.9 22.1 8.8 6.2 15.3
Cape Verde O 6.5 6.3 10.0 4.5 2.6 6.6
Burkina Faso O 5.5 5.4 2.3 6.1 7.8 3.0
Ghana O O 4.8 5.5 3.8 0.5 3.5 3.4
Senegal O 4.6 3.8 5.6 8.2 2.1 5.4
The Gambia O 4.5 5.5 9.5 2.9 4.8 7.5
Mali O O 4.5 2.9 3.4 7.6 8.8 5.2
Benin O 4.4 3.5 4.3 10.9 1.2 2.5
São Tomé and Príncipe O 3.6 4.0 3.0 10.9 3.7 6.7
Guinea O 3.1 3.9 -0.5 0.5 6.2 4.5
Niger O O 2.8 2.9 7.4 0.4 2.6 4.2
Togo O 1.9 2.6 5.5 -2.2 4.0 5.1
Guinea Bissau O 1.7 -0.3 5.3 13.7 16.7 9.0
Central African Republic O O 0.1 -0.4 -3.1 -1.1 -3.5 -6.7
Sources: IMF and ECB calculations.
Note: Data for Liberia and Mauritania are unavailable.
13  Current transfers take the form of official (e.g. aid) and private 
(e.g. remittances) transfers. Capital transfers have an impact on 
the capital account and comprise mainly debt relief and 
migrants’ transfers.
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in Chad and the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo. Net oil exporters with a current account 
surplus (Congo, Côte d’Ivoire, Gabon and 
Nigeria) benefited from foreign direct 
investment and debt relief, but also show 
comparatively large outflows of private 
transfers (Côte d’Ivoire and Gabon) and other 
investment (Congo and Gabon), reflecting the 
movement of remittances out of the country and 
the repayment of loans respectively.
The deficits in merchandise trade of most net 
oil importers were further aggravated by 
negative services and income balances. Only 
Cape Verde and The Gambia displayed a 
positive services balance, while all countries 
except Mauritania recorded net income 
outflows. However, for most economies the 
largest part of this shortfall was met by current 
and capital transfers, either from official or 
private sources. Guinea Bissau, São Tomé and 
Príncipe, Sierra Leone and The Gambia received 
considerable proportions of their external 
financing from foreign governments. In 
contrast, Cape Verde, Ghana and Senegal cover 
their deficits via private channels, mainly in the 
Table 3 Cumulated balance of payments flows, 1999-2005
(as a percentage of cumulated GDP)















Equatorial Guinea O O -23.4 67.1 -28.4 -61.3
Congo O 4.1 54.4 -23.9 -26.6
Gabon O O 12.5 40.9 -11.7 -12.9
Nigeria O O 4.4 22.5 -8.2 -13.4
Côte d’Ivoire O O O 1.2 16.8 -7.0 -5.4
Chad O O -23.4 8.9 -24.8 -11.2
Guinea -4.6 3.1 -6.3 -1.8
Cameroon O O -2.8 2.2 -1.9 -4.4
Central African Republic O O -3.6 0.9 -6.6 -0.7
Democratic Republic 
of the Congo O -4.2 -0.9 -4.5 -5.6
Mali O -7.4 -0.7 -6.3 -4.7
Niger O -6.2 -4.2 -5.2 -0.7
Guinea Bissau O O -6.9 -6.2 -13.7 -5.1
Burkina Faso O -9.9 -9.4 -4.0 -0.6
Sierra Leone O -8.6 -11.4 -7.4 -2.9
Benin O -7.4 -10.9 -1.3 -0.9
Togo O -12.1 -11.6 -4.7 -1.7
Senegal O -6.3 -11.8 -0.3 -1.7
Ghana O -4.9 -17.8 -2.3 -2.1
The Gambia O -6.6 -19.4 8.0 -5.1
Mauritania O -22.7 -22.5 -12.1 3.7
Cape Verde O O -10.3 -37.3 3.0 -2.1
São Tomé and Príncipe O -25.5 -48.7 -8.4 -5.1
Sources: IMF and ECB calculations. 
Note: Data for Liberia are unavailable.
1) Reserve assets are not necessarily equivalent to a country’s foreign exchange holdings, but might also include exceptional financing 
in the form of debt write-offs by foreign creditors.15
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form of remittances, which are also prominent 
in Guinea Bissau and Sierra Leone. Foreign 
direct investment and other investment are 
highly concentrated on the nascent oil producers 
Mauritania and São Tomé and Príncipe. For the 
remaining net oil importers, foreign direct 
investment plays a relatively minor role 
compared with current and capital transfers. 























0.5 -1.2 0.0 23.4 31.2 0.0 3.5 -11.3 Equatorial Guinea
0.2 0.0 1.2 -0.7 11.2 -0.2 -14.3 2.5 Congo
-0.5 -3.4 2.5 -14.4 1.9 0.0 -14.5 -1.8 Gabon
-0.1 3.5 0.0 -3.0 5.3 0.0 -2.1 -6.2 Nigeria
0.1 -3.3 1.6 -3.1 1.8 -1.6 -2.7 -0.6 Côte d’Ivoire
2.4 1.2 3.7 17.1 18.1 0.0 -0.4 -0.6 Chad
0.9 -0.5 1.5 2.5 1.2 0.0 1.6 -0.4 Guinea
0.5 0.9 0.1 2.2 2.4 1.5 -0.3 -1.3 Cameroon
2.5 0.4 2.0 1.3 0.5 0.0 0.4 0.3 Central African Republic
6.9 0.0 7.7 -0.4 4.4 -4.8 0.2 -0.2
Democratic Republic 
of the Congo
2.1 2.2 1.8 5.9 3.1 0.4 4.4 -2.0 Mali
3.1 0.8 3.0 3.7 0.6 0.4 2.0 0.7 Niger
11.6 6.6 27.9 -8.1 2.0 1.3 -8.8 -2.6 Guinea Bissau
3.2 1.0 4.8 3.3 0.5 0.0 2.7 0.0 Burkina Faso
6.5 6.5 8.9 3.1 2.2 0.0 3.3 -2.4 Sierra Leone
2.9 2.9 2.3 3.7 1.3 0.0 3.3 -1.0 Benin
1.1 4.8 1.4 6.3 0.0 1.0 5.9 -0.5 Togo
1.6 5.8 3.1 2.3 0.9 0.0 3.4 -2.1 Senegal
4.9 12.4 3.0 0.1 1.6 1.1 1.4 -3.9 Ghana
8.3 1.6 0.0 7.8 6.1 -0.6 2.4 0.0 The Gambia
5.2 3.1 0.2 24.9 19.3 0.0 6.1 -0.4 Mauritania
5.1 21.1 2.6 5.6 2.5 0.0 5.6 -2.6 Cape Verde
34.6 2.1 0.0 21.0 6.8 0.0 26.3 -12.0 São Tomé and Príncipe
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Box 1
PROFIT REPATRIATION IN GABON
Foreign ownership of local oil companies may 
be associated with substantial repatriation of 
corporate profits. The case of Gabon,1 where 
the major refinery is around 75% owned by 
western oil companies and appropriate data 
are available up to 2003, provides some 
evidence for the contribution of profit transfers 
to income balance deficits. Indeed, repatriated 
earnings of foreign companies seem to be 
roughly in line with the development of the oil 
price (see chart on the right). Expressed as a 
share of GDP, the level of foreign earnings 
which are not reinvested domestically amount 
to up to 7% of national GDP.2
Profit repatriation, Gabon
(as a percentage of GDP; oil price index 1995 = 100)
repatriated earnings (left-hand scale)
reinvested earnings (left-hand scale)


















1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Sources: IMF and ECB calculations.
Note: Data on earnings unavailable after 2003.       
1  See El Said and Leigh (2006) for details.
2  In the case of Congo, where data are only available for 2005, 
net repatriated earnings amounted to 18% of GDP. 
Almost all WCA countries have accumulated 
foreign exchange reserves (see Chart 8), despite 
sizeable current account deficits. In the case of 
recently-established (Chad and Equatorial 
Guinea) and future (Mauritania and São Tomé 
and Príncipe) oil producers, sizeable inflows of 
foreign direct investment and other investment 
have supported the accumulation of reserve 
assets. For many of the remaining countries, 
capital transfers in the form of debt forgiveness 
and migrants’ transfers have already reduced 
the current account deficit, so that any additional 
inflows into the financial account could 
contribute to further reserve building. Only 
Burkina Faso, the Central African Republic, 
Congo, The Gambia and Niger have registered 
a decline in reserve assets.
Government balances have improved for the 
majority of economies in the region (see 
Chart 9) with oil producers showing the largest 
surpluses.14 In contrast, trends in government 
finances of non-oil commodity exporters have 
been rather diverse and appear to be little 
affected by fluctuations in commodity prices, 




Note: Foreign exchange reserves data are unavailable for the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, for Guinea between January 
and December 2003 and for Mauritania after April 2004.      
net oil exporters, excluding Nigeria (left-hand scale)

































14  Revenues resulting from the prospect of future oil extraction, 
expected to begin in 2012, triggered an extraordinary swing in 
São Tomé and Príncipe’s government balance, from -26.6% of 
GDP in 2004 to 59.3% in 2005, with oil signature bonuses 
accounting for close to 60% of São Tomé and Príncipe’s 
government receipts in 2005.17
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Chart 9 Change in the government balance 
as a share of GDP, 1999 vs. 2005
(percentage points)
Sources: IMF and ECB calculations. 
Note: Data for Liberia are unavailable.
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reflecting the comparatively low share of the 
respective commodity sector in revenues in 
many of these countries (see Table 1).
The direct impact of soaring oil prices on 
government expenditure seems to have been 
limited. While the majority of countries in the 
region exert some kind of price control over 
petroleum products (see Chart 12), price 
subsidies, which would have an immediate 
effect on the budget, are rare.15
Inflation in most WCA economies was 
comparatively low between 1999 and 2005 (see 
Chart 11), with only five countries recording 
average annual inflation rates above 10%.16   
Outliers were Ghana, where prices have risen at 
an annual rate of close to 20% on the back of a 
sharply depreciating exchange rate in 1999-2000 
and an upward adjustment of regulated prices for 
electricity and petroleum products, and the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, which faced 
hyperinflation of more than 100% annually in the 
wake of its prolonged period of conflict. 
The impact of commodity price changes on 
inflation developments seems to have been 
limited, given the level and volatility of inflation 
rates in the region (see Charts 10 and 11) and 
the dynamics of commodity price changes (see 
Charts 3 and 4) in the period 1999-2005.17 
Rather, inflation seems to have been largely 
determined by monetary and fiscal policies, in 
particular the exchange rate regime.
The countries of the CFA Franc Zone (see 
Box 2), including those experiencing strong 
capital inflows related to soaring prices of 
their main export commodities, have displayed 
Chart 10 Inflation, 1999-2005
(percentages, annual average)
Sources: IMF and ECB calculations. 
Note: Data for Liberia are unavailable. 
1) CAEMC members 
2) WAEMU members
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15  Among the non-oil producers in Western and Central Africa, 
only Cape Verde, Ghana and Senegal subsidise prices. 
Interestingly, government balances of the former two improved 
between 1999 and 2005.
16  Official inflation figures may be distorted by the subsidising of 
particular goods comprising the CPI basket, particularly 
petroleum products.
17  This is in line with the evidence presented in Deaton and Miller 
(1995) who did not find a direct causal link between international 
commodity prices and domestic price levels in sub-Saharan 
African countries for the period 1962-1988.
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the lowest rates of inflation.18 Inflation 
developments in the WAEMU and CAEMC 
followed a downward trend after peaking at 
5.1% (WAEMU) and 6.6% (CAEMC) in mid-
2001. After a short period of deflation in the 
first half of 2004, prices have picked up again, 
bringing inflation closer to the levels last seen 
in 2001.
For economies outside the CFA Franc Zone, 
inflation has been at a more elevated level 
and subject to considerable volatility (see 
Chart 11). Between 1999 and 2005, monthly 
year-on-year inflation rates ranged from 1.2% 
to 27.7%, with episodes of high and low 
inflation following on from each other relatively 
rapidly, mainly triggered by developments in 
Nigeria and Ghana, the largest economies in the 
group. Year-on-year inflation in Nigeria peaked 
at 23.2% in April 2001 and 24.8% in February 
2004, following an expansionary monetary 
policy, and at 28.5% in August 2005, on the 
back of increases in domestic fuel and food 
prices.
Summing up, the majority of WCA economies 
performed well between 1999 and 2005, 
although differences between net oil-exporting 
and importing countries in the region are 
apparent. Net oil exporters recorded the highest 
growth rates, mainly supported by rising 
investment and exports on the back of record 
oil prices and an expanding oil sector in some 
countries. Net oil-importing countries displayed 
lower growth, which was largely driven by 
domestic factors, most notably private 
consumption. An increasing oil price placed a 
burden on these economies, often counteracting 
benefits accruing from rising prices for their 
own main export products. Interestingly, 
inflation rates seem to have remained relatively 
unaffected by changes in commodity prices. 
Instead, the exchange rate regime of individual 
countries (see Box 2) and their respective 
monetary and fiscal policies emerge as the 
determining factor in inflation developments 
(see Section 3). 
18 Only Equatorial Guinea exhibits an inflation rate which is 
notably higher than that of other CAEMC members, a 
development driven by a rapidly expanding oil sector triggering 
an abundance of liquidity and encountering supply constraints 
in the rest of the economy.
Chart 11 Inflation, 1999-2005
(percentages, year on year)
Sources: IMF and ECB calculations.
Note: Averages weighted by purchasing power parities.
1) Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, 
Equatorial Guinea, Gabon; data for Equatorial Guinea are 
unavailable after May 2005.
2) Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea Bissau, Mali, 
Niger, Senegal, Togo.
3) Cape Verde, The Gambia, Ghana, Mauritania, Nigeria, Sierra 
Leone; excluding the Democratic Republic of the Congo; 
monthly inflation data for Guinea, Liberia and São Tomé and 
Príncipe are unavailable; monthly inflation data for Nigeria are 




































MONETARY AND EXCHANGE RATE ARRANGEMENTS IN WESTERN AND CENTRAL AFRICA
The majority of WCA countries are either members of an existing monetary arrangement or are 
striving for closer monetary cooperation. The Central African Economic and Monetary 
Community (CAEMC), comprising Cameroon, Central African Republic, Chad, Congo, 
Equatorial Guinea and Gabon, and the West African Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU), 
consisting of Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea Bissau, Mali, Niger, Senegal and 19
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Togo, together form the CFA Franc Zone. Their currencies are pegged to the euro at a rate of 
655.95 CFA Francs per euro. The convertibility of CFA Francs into French Francs and since 
1999 into euro is guaranteed by the French Treasury. In spite of these close links to the euro, 
inflation developments in the CFA Franc Zone only partially follow those in the euro area (see 
Chart A), indicating that the economies of the CFA Franc Zone are exposed to shocks which 
are often different to those facing the euro area.
In 2000, the Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Nigeria and Sierra Leone established the West African 
Monetary Zone (WAMZ), originally aiming at the introduction of a common currency for the 
five countries by mid-2005. Up to now, progress has been limited, as all members have been 
maintaining their own national monetary policies, even though the WAMZ’s exchange rate 
mechanism requires the exchange rate of each currency against the US dollar to be maintained 
within a ±15% target band around a central rate. However, none of the central banks has 
implemented this measure so far. Only Nigeria adopted a tightly managed float in February 
2005, aimed at keeping the naira within a band of ±3% against the US dollar. Before that, and 
in line with all other currencies in the WAMZ, its currency has been depreciating considerably 
since 1999 (see Chart B). 
Of the remaining countries, Cape Verde maintains a fixed peg to the euro. Mauritania tightly 
managed its exchange rate against the US dollar until May 2005, when it reclassified its regime 
to a fixed peg against the US currency. São Tomé and Príncipe has sustained a managed float 
with a depreciating trend against the US dollar since 1999. Finally, the currency of the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo lost more than 99% of its value between 1999 and 2005, 
reflecting the country’s ongoing involvement in conflicts up to late 2002.
Chart A Inflation in the euro area and the 
CFA Franc Zone, 1999-2005
(percentages, year on year)
Sources: IMF and ECB calculations.
Note: CAEMC and WAEMU averages weighted by purchasing 























euro area (right-hand scale)
Jan. July Jan. July Jan. July Jan. July Jan. July Jan. July Jan. July Jan.
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Chart B Exchange rates of WAMZ members 
against the US dollar, 1999-2005
(index, January 1999 = 100; an upward movement indicates 
depreciation)
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Box 3
DUTCH DISEASE PHENOMENA IN WESTERN AND CENTRAL AFRICA?
High inflation rates have brought about a real exchange rate appreciation of the currencies of 
WCA oil-exporting countries, which has raised concerns about a possible “Dutch disease” 
effect. Dutch disease is the effect of a large inflow of foreign currency associated with real 
exchange rate appreciation and a loss in competitiveness. 
Among the core oil-exporting countries in the 
WCA region, Nigeria’s real effective exchange 
rate (REER) has increased by more than a 
third since 2000 (see the chart). The picture 
for the other oil exporters, which are all 
members of the CAEMC, is mixed. While, on 
average, the REER in the CAEMC has not 
fully recovered from the 1994 devaluation, 
standing at about 88% of the pre-1994 level, 
there are substantial differences within the 
region. Equatorial Guinea is the CAEMC 
country that has experienced the largest 
appreciation, equal to 114% of its pre-
devaluation value, also reflecting the fact that 
the United States and countries whose 
currencies are pegged to the US dollar account 
for almost 50% of its trade.
Non-oil exports have declined since the late 
1990s, both in absolute terms and as ratios to 
GDP and to total exports. Moreover, non-oil 
exports have become less diversified over the last five years.1 Subject to all caveats to this 
limited analysis, this might be the main indicator suggesting the presence of Dutch disease 
phenomena. 
1  See IMF (2005).
Real appreciation, oil exporters
(real effective exchange rates, 2000 = 100)
























3   MAJOR CHANNELS THROUGH WHICH 
COMMODITY PRICE CHANGES INFLUENCE 
INFLATION
This section aims to analyse in greater detail 
why the impact of commodity price developments 
on inflation in WCA countries has been limited. 
It focuses on the pass-through channel whereby 
changes in international commodity prices have 
a direct impact on the corresponding retail 
prices in domestic economies, the spending 
channel, i.e. an increase in private or government 
spending, reflecting strong GDP growth and a 
rise in government revenues, and the liquidity 
channel, which shows the impact of strong 
capital inflows on foreign exchange reserve 
accumulation and excess liquidity in the 
banking sector. 
Given their strong rise in the recent past and 
their importance for economic developments in 
general (see Section 2), the analysis focuses on 
the inflationary effects of oil prices, while 
distinguishing between oil-exporting and oil-21
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importing countries. In the WCA region, three 
groups of oil exporters can be distinguished. 
The first group consists of six countries for 
which oil is the major export commodity, 
namely Cameroon, Chad, Congo, Equatorial 
Guinea, Gabon – all CAEMC countries – and 
Nigeria. Côte d’Ivoire and the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo comprise the second 
group. While both of these countries are 
currently net oil exporters,19 oil is not their 
main export commodity. Finally, Mauritania 
and São Tomé and Príncipe constitute the third 
group, as oil resources have been discovered 
recently in these two countries, giving them the 
status of prospective oil exporters. While this 
section’s analysis of oil-exporting countries 
mainly focuses on the first group, reference is 
made to the second and third groups when 
appropriate. All other WCA countries are 
referred to as oil importers. 
3.1 PASS-THROUGH  CHANNEL
Many WCA countries have seen a relatively 
high pass-through of international oil prices to 
domestic petrol prices (see Chart 12). In eleven 
countries, the pass-through effect has been 
greater than 0.8, indicating a substantial first-
round effect of international oil price movements 
on domestic petrol prices.20 Due to limited 
data, an analysis of possible second-round 
effects is difficult. However, relatively 
contained inflation rates suggest that the impact 
of such second-round effects on the overall 
price level has been limited. 
The relatively high pass-through in many WCA 
countries has been observed despite widespread 
price controls (see Chart 12). 13 WCA countries 
have ad hoc price controls in place and seven 
countries adjust domestic prices on the basis of 
a formula that is automatically applied in the 
event of changes in international prices. Only 
Guinea and Ghana, which are among the five 
countries with the highest pass-through 
coefficients, allow their domestic petrol prices 
to adjust freely to changes in international 
prices. 
Chart 12 Petrol pass-through
(ratio of the change in the retail price to the change in the 
import price, in national currency, 2003-2006)
Source: IMF.
Note: The price regime is indicated by (A) for automatic price 
controls, (AH) for ad-hoc price controls and (L) for liberalised 
prices. An asterisk (*) denotes price subsidisation. Data on 
pass-through are not available for Cape Verde, Chad, Liberia 
and Mauritania. For Chad and Mauritania, no information on 
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Oil-exporting countries (0.51) have experienced 
a lower average pass-through ratio than oil 
importers (1.07), possibly reflecting the more 
19 Given the ongoing post-conflict recovery, the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo is likely to become a net oil importer in 
the near future. 
20  Applying the method used in IMF (2006b), the pass-through 
effect is calculated as the ratio of the change in retail prices to 
the change in import prices of petrol in national currency 
between 2003 and 2006. For data availability, see the note to 
Chart 12.
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widespread use of oil price subsidies.21 Indeed, 
four oil exporters have been subsidising 
domestic petrol prices (see Chart 12), while 
only three net oil importers have used this 
instrument to limit price increases in the 
domestic market.  21  This observation is in line with the results of a study recently 
conducted by the World Bank (2006). See also IMF (2006b). 
Chart 13 Demand components, oil exporters
(indices of total real demand, real GDP)
Sources: IMF and ECB calculations. 
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3.2 SPENDING  CHANNEL
The spending response of oil-exporting WCA 
countries to the rise in oil prices has been 
mixed. While domestic demand has increased 23
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substantially in Equatorial Guinea, Congo and 
Nigeria (in the latter two countries it has even 
outpaced the growth of real GDP), spending 
behaviour has been more moderate in the other 
oil-exporting countries (see Chart 13). While 
private sector spending for investment or 
consumption purposes has been the main driver 
of domestic demand in almost all oil-exporting 
countries, as well as in the prospective oil 
producer São Tomé and Príncipe, public 
spending has also expanded, in particular in 
Equatorial Guinea and Nigeria. 
Among oil-importing countries, the expansion 
of demand has been subdued and mainly reflects 
a rise in private consumption. Due to regional 
conflicts, domestic demand has seen temporary 
slumps in several countries, such as the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo and Sierra 
Leone (see Chart A1 in the Annex). At the same 
time, several oil exporters have recorded 
sizeable budget surpluses, indicating that 
governments have saved a substantial part of 
the windfall revenues originating from 
commodity price rises. This holds true in 
particular for Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon 
and Nigeria (see Chart 14; for oil-importing 
countries, see Chart A2 in the Annex). The 
budget positions of Cameroon and Chad, 
however, have not benefited significantly from 
the oil price boom. In the case of Cameroon, 
this may be due to the relatively small share of 
oil exports in GDP (6.3% in 2005, see Table 1). 
In Chad, where public finance management is 
considered to be weak, oil production only 
started in 2003. 
In the medium to long term, however, strong 
public spending may become a cause of 
mounting inflationary pressure if – as in the 
past22 – oil revenues are not used efficiently, 
ie. for raising the productive potential and 
diversifying the economies concerned. Sound 
investments that strengthen the supply side of 
the economy, including the institutions 
supporting a functioning market economy, will 
be key in ensuring sustainable, non-inflationary 
growth. Efficient use of oil revenues is by 
no means assured as standard indicators 
suggest that oil-exporting WCA countries 
face substantial governance challenges (see 
Table 4). 
Moreover, inflation risks may arise in the 
event of a substantial drop in the price of oil 
and other commodities. Experience of past 
commodity price booms suggests that adjusting 
public spending in the wake of a decline in 
commodity prices may be difficult due to policy 
reversal costs.23 Thus, government spending 
Table 4 Oil exporters, governance indicators in 2004












quality Rule of law
Control of
corruption
Cameroon -0.9 -1.2 -0.9 -0.6 -0.7 -1.0 -0.8
Chad -1.1 -1.1 -1.2 -1.3 -0.8 -1.2 -1.1
Congo -1.1 -0.8 -1.4 -1.2 -1.2 -1.2 -1.0
Equatorial Guinea -1.1 -1.7 -0.3 -1.4 -0.8 -1.0 -1.6
Gabon -0.5 -0.7 0.0 -0.5 -0.5 -0.5 -0.6
Nigeria -1.2 -1.2 -1.2 -1.2 -1.2 -1.2 -1.2
WCA oil producers 
(arithmetic average) -1.0 -1.1 -0.8 -1.0 -0.9 -1.0 -1.1
Source: World Bank.
22  For evidence on spending behaviour of oil producers during the 
oil price boom of the 1970s, see Malik (2006), Ondo Mañe 
(2005) and Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian (2003).
23  Policy reversal costs typically stem from sunk costs related to 
investments and from difficulties in reducing public sector 
employment and wages, Boccara and Devarajan (1993). On 
fiscal soundness as a prerequisite for a favourable institutional 
monetary policy setting in the context of highly oil-dependent 
countries, see also Fanizza and Söderling (2006). 24
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Chart 14 Government balance, oil exporters
(balance as a percentage of GDP; oil price index, 1995 = 100)
Sources: IMF and ECB calculations. 
Note: Data for 2006 are estimates.
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tends to remain high and increasingly financed 
by public borrowing, and possibly through 
monetary financing. As a result, countries may 
face inflationary pressure at times of declining 
oil and commodity prices.
Up to now, however, the inflationary impact of 
any increase in spending originating from a 
rise in the price of oil and other commodities 
seems to have been mitigated by a flexible 
supply-side response on the part of domestic 
and global markets. While it is difficult to 
quantify output gaps for the economies under 
review,24 the available evidence suggests that 
capacity constraints have not yet become 
binding (see Chart A3 in the Annex), possibly 
reflecting a rapidly growing labour force. World 
Bank data indicate that since 1990 the labour 
force in the region as a whole has increased by 
50%, with the annual rate of increase ranging 
between 2.2% and 3.2%.
Other indicators measuring capacity 
constraints, such as the unemployment rate or 
wage and productivity growth rates, are not 
available for most WCA countries. For the 
countries that do publish unemployment data, 
no general trend can be identified. While 
Nigeria has reported a stable unemployment 
rate of 4.5% since 2002, unemployment in Côte 
d’Ivoire increased from 6.7% in 1999 to 8.4% 
in 2005. By contrast, Cape Verde and São Tomé 
and Príncipe have seen a gradual decline in 
unemployment, but current rates are still around 
18%. Thus, while the available evidence should 
be interpreted with caution, as employment 
might have increased in the informal sectors25 
of the economies, possibly leading to rising 
wage pressures, it does not provide strong 
support for the proposition that countries face 
an immediate risk of strong inflationary demand 
pressures. 
Inflationary pressures originating from a rise 
in private and public spending have also been 
contained, as a large part of the increase in 
domestic demand has been directed towards 
global markets. As a result, imports have risen 
substantially when expressed as a share of GDP 
(see Chart 15), but even more so in absolute 
terms. Indeed, expressed in US dollars, imports 
by Chad and Equatorial Guinea were more than 
four times higher in 2006 than in 1999. Nigeria, 
the largest oil producer in the region, was 
expected to import goods and services in the 
amount of about USD 38 billion in 2006, up 
from close to USD 15 billion in 1999. 
24 Given that output series have been disrupted by exogenous 
shocks and political instability in many WCA countries, it is 
statistically difficult to calculate reliable output gaps by 
applying a band-pass filter which isolates the long-term trend 
from the short-term cyclical component. 
25  ILO data on selected Sub-Saharan African economies suggest 
that the informal sector accounts for a sizeable share of total 
employment. For example, data for Cameroon (1992), Ghana 
(1999) and Nigeria (1999) put the informal sector’s share of 
total employment at more than 30% in Nigeria and more than 
80% in the other two countries (Xaba, Horn and Motala 2002). 





Chart 15 Import intensity, oil and mineral 
exporters
(imports as a percentage of GDP)
Sources: IMF and ECB calculations.
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Box 4
STABILISATION FUNDS, SAVINGS FUNDS AND FISCAL RULES
Stabilisation funds aim to adjust government spending and cushion the domestic economy from 
sharp and unpredictable variations in commodity prices and, consequently, in revenues. 
Stabilisation funds face a number of challenges, including determining the benchmark value 
of the respective commodity price. Commodity prices usually exhibit random walk behaviour 
and do not fluctuate around a fixed average. Moreover, funds will not fulfil their stabilising 
function if the overall fiscal policy stance does not reflect the position of the commodity price 
cycle. In the past, optimistic revenue expectations during commodity booms have led many 
countries to engage in heavy borrowing which was facilitated by easy access to credit from 
global markets. The objective of savings funds is to save part of the export receipts for future 
generations, given that mineral resources are non-renewable. When a country opts for a fiscal 
rule rather than a stabilisation or savings fund, it regulates government spending on the basis 
of a benchmark value related to the price of the commodity or the volume of exports. A fiscal 
rule is a less binding commitment than that implied by savings or stabilisation funds, as it does 
not entail the accumulation of revenues but only regulates the level of spending in line with 
prospective revenues from the commodity. 
Among WCA countries, funds have been established mainly in oil exporting countries, namely 
Gabon, Chad, Equatorial Guinea (savings) and Mauritania (stabilisation). São Tomé and 
Príncipe and Burkina Faso aim to establish a savings fund for oil revenues and a stabilisation 
fund for cash crop revenues respectively, while Cameroon and Nigeria have opted for fiscal 
rules. The implementation of selected funds and rules is discussed in the following 
paragraphs.
The Gabon Fund for Future Generations (FGF), established in 1998, is serving the country for 
the transition from an economy highly dependent on oil to a diversified one, owing to the fact 
that Gabon’s oil resources will be exhausted within 30 years. The fund is held at the Banque 
Centrale des États d’Afrique Centrale and – as at June 2006 – has been remunerated at 2.2% 
as a “special account”. According to the law that established the fund, assets are to be invested 
in stocks of companies with international reputations and in low-risk financial instruments. 
However, capital was withdrawn in 2003 and, generally, the fund receives low contributions 
from the budget, probably because the interest rate on public debt is much higher than the FGF 
interest rate and the government is more committed to the repayment of debt. Indeed, in the 
past six years the fund has accumulated only XAF 240 billion while oil revenues have increased 
by XAF 450 billion.1 
In Chad, a Revenue Management Programme was implemented in 1998 in recognition of the 
establishment of a pipeline between Chad and Cameroon, supported by the World Bank. Under 
the Programme, the Chad government was committed to placing 10% of direct oil revenues 
from dividends and royalties in a trust for future generations. From the beginning of the oil 
boom in 2003 until early 2006, the trust accumulated USD 36 million. However, in January 
2006, the fund was abolished as a result of the reform of the Revenue Management Programme, 
and its revenues were transferred to the budget.
1  See IMF (2006d).27
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In 1998, Equatorial Guinea established a Fund for Future Generations and adopted a law 
whereby 0.5% of oil revenues would be held in the Fund. Although the government has adhered 
to this commitment in recent years, the value of 0.5% is too low to constitute a major constraint 
for government balances.
Mauritania became an oil exporter in February 2006. In March 2006, it established the National 
Hydrocarbon Revenue Fund (FNRH). The fund receives all oil revenues that accrue to the 
government, namely shares of profits and bonuses, taxes paid by all enterprises in the sector 
and dividends paid by the Mauritanian Hydrocarbon Company. The FNRH is an offshore 
account placed with the Banque de France and directly managed by the Banque Centrale de 
Mauritanie. It does not borrow, and income earned on the assets is reinvested. The resources 
of the FNRH are either saved in order to smooth the adjustment of public spending if prices 
were to fall, or are used to repay outstanding debt, including government debt vis-à-vis the 
central bank. Data from the Comité National de Suivi des Revenues des Hydrocarbures, which 
supervises the fund, indicate that while revenue accumulation in the fund has been fairly stable, 
at an average of USD 15 million per month, withdrawals from the fund have been conducted 
quite irregularly and range from USD 40 million in July 2006 to zero withdrawals in August 
and September. 
São Tomé and Príncipe aims to establish a savings fund, as estimates indicate that in 2013 oil 
revenues will become a stable source of financing for the budget. The Permanent Fund for 
Future Generations (PFFG) will be regulated by a fiscal rule based on the model of the 
permanent income hypothesis (PIH). Simulations suggest that, in the scenario of the PIH, 
budget revenues from oil will be stable until 2033 at around USD 92 million per annum, with 
the PFFG reaching a steady state level of USD 3.1 billion. Thus, fiscal policy is pursuing an 
adjustment path towards the assumed steady state level taking account of the annual budget 
revenues predicted under the PIH.2 
Stabilisation funds may also benefit agricultural commodity producers. Although windfall 
revenues are not as large as in the case of oil, agricultural commodity prices have been volatile 
in the past. Against this background, cotton farmers and ginning companies in Burkina Faso 
are considering the application of a cotton price-setting mechanism (Fonds de Lissage), which 
would tie domestic producer prices to a moving average band of past and expected future price 
developments. If prices exceeded the band, cash reserves would be built up. If prices fell below 
the band, producers would receive the agreed domestic producer price, with the difference 
being drawn from the fund. If this mechanism works well, it may be extended to other countries 
and other agricultural commodities.
After several attempts to establish a stabilisation fund in the 1990s, Nigeria has adopted a fiscal 
rule which takes into consideration a calculated stream of oil revenue at an assumed constant 
price per barrel.3 The 2004 budget was based on an assumed oil price of USD 25 per barrel and 
production of 2.5 million barrels per day. Thus, the government saved oil revenues in excess 
of this benchmark price and production level (equivalent to 4.5% of GDP). This led to savings 
of about USD 6 billion in 2004 and an increase in international reserves to USD 28 billion in 
2005, of which USD 8 billion were used for the Paris Club debt relief agreement. 
2  See Segura (2006).
3  See Fasano (2000).
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3.3 LIQUIDITY  CHANNEL
The rise in commodity prices has been 
associated with strong capital inflows to WCA 
countries, raising the level of liquidity in the 
receiving financial sectors. Moreover, in many 
WCA countries, capital inflows have also 
reflected an increase in remittance flows and 
foreign aid.26 Additionally, keen interest in the 
African continent from emerging economies, 
most notably China, is likely to contribute to 
future capital inflows to some countries in the 
region.27
Given the dominance of fixed exchange rate 
regimes in WCA countries, strong capital 
inflows have been accompanied by a rapid rise 
in foreign exchange reserves (see Chart 8). 
While the increase has been most pronounced 
in oil-exporting countries, foreign exchange 
reserves have been growing rapidly in other 
WCA countries as well, in particular in countries 
where oil production has just started or is set to 
start (Mauritania and São Tomé and Príncipe) 
and in countries experiencing a surge in 
remittances (Cape Verde and Ghana). Chart A4 
in the Annex illustrates foreign reserves together 
with commodity price developments.
Countries experiencing the most rapid rise in 
foreign exchange reserves have made active use 
of sterilisation instruments. While the ratio of 
foreign exchange reserves to reserve money 
was broadly stable or even declined slightly in 
nine countries in the period 2000–2005, the 
ratio grew rapidly in some oil-exporting 
countries (Congo, Equatorial Guinea, Gabon 
and Nigeria) and the two prospective oil-
exporting countries (Mauritania and São Tomé 
and Príncipe), as well as in Cape Verde and 
Ghana, two non-oil exporters experiencing 
strong growth in foreign exchange reserves. 
This suggests that authorities have been making 
active use of sterilisation instruments, thereby 
limiting the impact of foreign exchange 
interventions on reserve money growth.28
Correlation analysis reveals that in Nigeria 
growth in foreign exchange reserves was even 
negatively correlated with growth in reserve 
money in the period 1999-2005, indicating that 
the authorities were particularly active in 
sterilising interventions (see also Box 5). In the 
CAEMC and the WAEMU, the correlation 
between growth rates of foreign exchange 
reserves and reserve money has been positive, 
reaching 0.75 in the CAEMC and 0.84 in the 
WAEMU. 
Cameroon has restrained government spending through a built-in contingency mechanism 
formulated in 2003. The mechanism aims to regulate expenditure from oil revenues and net 
domestic borrowing. Oil revenues were based on the assumption of a price of USD 25.70 per 
barrel of Cameroonian crude and an export volume of 18 million barrels for the second half of 
2003, and on projections for subsequent years. Based on these assumptions, a quantitative 
performance criterion on the contribution of oil revenues to the government budget was 
estimated. Higher than programmed oil revenues and all privatisation proceeds are allocated 
to repayments of domestic and external debt.
26 On capital inflows in Sub-Saharan Africa, see Mohanty and 
Turner (2006). Barnichon and Peiris (2007) estimate the real 
money gap for selected African countries and find a significant 
impact of excess money on inflation.
27 During the last China-Africa summit held in Beijing in 
November 2006, China pledged to double its aid to Africa by 
2009 and to provide USD 10 billion in preferential loans and 
export credits. Deals signed with WCA countries in the context 
of the summit included a USD 3 billion iron ore development 
project with Gabon, encompassing the extension of a railway 
and the construction of a bulk commodities and container port, 
the building of a USD 600 million hydroelectric dam in Ghana 
and the realisation of a USD 8 billion railway project in Nigeria, 
to which China granted a USD 2.5 billion loan.
28  Calvo and Reinhart (1999) review the experience of sterilisation 
efforts of various sub-Saharan African countries. Boccara and 
Devarajan (1993) highlight the challenges of sterilisation in the 
context of the CFA monetary unions.29
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Box 5
FOREIGN EXCHANGE INTERVENTIONS AND STERILISATION IN NIGERIA
Rising oil prices associated with strong capital inflows to Nigeria have put the exchange rate 
under appreciation pressures to which the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) has reacted by 
carrying out substantial interventions in the foreign exchange market. As a result, foreign 
exchange reserves rose from USD 6.7 billion at end-2003 to USD 39.2 billion in August 
2006. 
In 2004 and 2005, the CBN was successful in 
limiting money supply growth to levels between 
15% and 20%, while foreign exchange reserves 
grew by up to 140% (see the chart). This 
performance reflects a number of sterilisation 
measures taken by the authorities:
1.  The withdrawal of public sector deposits 
from commercial banks. Between 2004 
and 2005, deposits of the public sector, 
mainly those of the Nigerian National 
Petroleum Company, which holds a 57% 
share of the total oil industry, were moved 
from commercial banks to the CBN. Public 
sector deposits at the CBN steadily 
increased from about NGN 200 billion in 
November 2003 to more than NGN 2,300 
billion in mid-2005. Since then, the amount 
of deposits held at the CBN has been quite 
volatile, fluctuating between NGN 1,200 billion and NGN 2,700 billion, sterilising between 
40% and 60% of total foreign exchange reserves.
2.  Sale of bonds. Between November 2003 and August 2005, the CBN was active in selling 
CBN bonds to mop up excess liquidity. Bond sales increased from NGN 30,650 million in 
November 2003 to NGN 73,400 million in August 2005.
3.  Raising reserve requirements. At the beginning of 2005, the CBN raised the cash rate ratio 
(CRR)1 from 9.5% to 10%. At end-2005, however, probably as a response to a decline in 
broad money growth seen at the end of 2005, the ratio was cut to 5%. 
Since early 2006 broad money growth has been accelerating, once again reaching more than 
30% year on year and almost 60% at an annualised rate – close to the growth rate observed for 
foreign exchange reserves. Against the background of a target range of 15%-17% for broad 
money growth, and renewed inflationary pressures, the CBN raised the minimum rediscount 
rate from 13% to 14%.
1  The cash rate ratio is defined as the proportion of the total demand deposits, savings and time deposits which banks are expected to 
keep as deposits with the central bank.
Growth rates of monetary aggregates
(percentages, year on year)
Sources: IMF and ECB calculations.
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The exchange rate regime, sterilisation efforts 
and resource endowments are key factors 
explaining the divergence of broad money 
growth rates in the region (see Chart 16). In the 
CAEMC, where the growth of foreign exchange 
reserves and reserve money has increased 
substantially in recent years, reflecting the 
dominance of oil-exporting countries in the 
group and a lack of sterilisation, year-on-year 
broad money growth has been accelerating, 
peaking in May 2006 at 30%. By contrast, broad 
money growth in the WAEMU, which consists 
of non-oil-exporting countries, has remained 
subdued, albeit recently increasing to about 8%. 
Nigeria has seen the largest volatility in money 
growth rates. In general, credit growth to the 
private sector has followed developments in 
monetary aggregates.
Standard indicators of financial development 
suggest that financial sectors in most WCA 
countries are underdeveloped. The level of 
monetisation, as measured by the broad money 
to GDP ratio, is below 30% and the level of 
financial intermediation, as measured by the 
private sector credit to GDP ratio, is below 15% 
in most countries (see Chart 17). 
WCA countries are largely cash-based 
economies. In 17 countries the share of currency 
in broad money is around 20% or more. In some 
countries, such as the Central African Republic, 
Chad and Guinea Bissau, currency accounts for 
even more than 60% of broad money. 
Faced with strong inflows of foreign capital, 
commercial bank reserves held with the central 
bank in excess of the required reserves have 
Chart 16 Growth in broad money
(percentages, year on year)










































Jan. July Jan. July Jan. July Jan. July Jan. July Jan.
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Chart 17 Financial market depth
(broad money and credit, as percentages of GDP, averaged 
over 2000-2005)
Sources: IMF and ECB calculations.
Note: Broad money is defined as money plus quasi-money, 
credit denotes credit to the private sector. Data for the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo and Liberia are not 
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CHALLENGES been rising rapidly in some WCA countries,29 in 
particular in oil-exporting countries such as 
Congo, Equatorial Guinea and Gabon (see 
Chart 18; see Chart A5 in the Annex for oil-
importing countries). In general, however, 
excess reserve ratios have been rather stable, 
albeit at high levels, in most cases surpassing 
the level of required reserves, thereby 
confirming the underdeveloped status of 
financial sectors in many WCA countries. This 
suggests that banks have been unwilling or 
unable (for example due to a lack of bankable 
projects in a poor lending environment) to 
expand financial intermediation in an 
environment characterised by rapid output 
growth. 
A strong increase in the demand for money is 
the most plausible explanation for the limited 
impact of strong foreign exchange, reserve and 
broad money growth on inflation. Standard 
money demand functions suggest that rapid 
output growth in an environment characterised 
by comparatively low inflation and broad 
exchange rate stability should lead to a rise in 
money demand. Moreover, similar evidence has 
been found in other resource-rich economies, 
such as Russia.
However, the abundance of liquidity in many 
WCA countries may lead to increasing 
inflationary pressures in the medium term. In 
particular, risks to the inflation outlook may 
arise if – reflecting potential low levels of 
governance and financial development – either 
the government or the banking sector channels 
liquid funds to inefficient investment projects, 
thereby combining the potential inflationary 
impact of both the spending channel and the 
liquidity channel.30 Moreover, it may be difficult 
for monetary authorities to influence money 
supply and steer domestic demand if banks hold 
large amounts of liquidity in excess of minimum 
reserves. This is because mopping up liquidity 
can be very costly since issuing bonds or 
increasing remunerated minimum reserve 
requirements would increase the interest burden 
of the central bank. 
29 Following Saxegaard (2006), excess liquidity is defined as 
commercial bank holdings of liquid assets with the central bank 
in excess of the effective statutory level. Country data up to 
2004 are taken from Saxegaard (2006) and updated to 2006 if 
available. 
30  See IMF (2006c) and Sy (2006) on financial sector challenges 
in the context of excess liquidity in the CAEMC and the 
WAEMU, respectively.
4  CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY CHALLENGES
Given the diversity of WCA economies, no 
general assessment of economic developments 
in the region can be derived that fits each 
individual country. Bearing this caveat in mind, 
it seems fair to conclude that in the early years 
of the new millennium many WCA economies 
have enjoyed a period of strong growth which 
has been accompanied by a relatively high 
degree of monetary stability. 
While rising commodity prices have supported 
export growth in almost all economies, economic 
developments in net oil exporters and importers 
have been markedly different, as (prospective) 
oil exporters have – in general – seen higher 
growth and inflation than other WCA countries. 
The divergence is not only caused by the fact 
that oil prices have been increasing much faster 
than prices of other commodities, but also by 
the extreme importance of oil for the economies 
of most oil-exporting countries, and the need 
for oil importers to cope with rising import 
prices. 
Many WCA countries have been faced with the 
challenge of absorbing strong capital inflows 
in a non-inflationary, growth-promoting 
manner. This has been most obvious in resource-
rich countries, given the current account 
implications of rising commodity prices. 
However, in some countries capital inflows 
have also been associated with rapidly rising 
remittances and foreign aid flows.
Up to now, the inflationary impact of the rise in 
commodity prices, in particular oil prices, and 
of the associated increase in domestic spending 
and benign liquidity conditions, has been 
limited. More detailed analysis reveals that 
governments of oil-rich countries have reacted 32
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Chart 18 Excess liquidity, oil exporters
(percentages of total bank deposits, price index, 1995 = 100)
Sources: IMF, Saxegaard (2006), national sources and ECB calculations.
Note: The CAEMC countries Cameroon, Chad, Congo, Equatorial Guinea and Gabon introduced minimum reserve requirements in 2001.
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quite prudently to the windfall revenues 
originating from higher oil prices. Although 
spending has increased substantially, the budget 
position has improved markedly in several 
countries, with some governments running 
sizeable fiscal surpluses. Moreover, the supply-
side response to the rise in private and public 
spending has been favourable. Capacity 
constraints in domestic markets have not yet 
been reached, while global markets have been 
easily supplying goods and services, as shown 
by the rapid rise in imports by WCA countries. 
Finally, sterilisation efforts and an increase in 
money demand have helped dampen inflationary 
pressures resulting from the rise in liquidity 
originating from strong capital inflows.
Sustaining non-inflationary growth in an 
environment characterised by high commodity 
prices remains the key policy challenge facing 
WCA authorities. The challenge is daunting, as 
out of the 24-country sample, 16 economies 
operate under fixed exchange rate regimes, 
either in the form of the CFA monetary unions 
or a currency peg. Of the eight remaining 
countries, seven operate under a managed float 
regime, with only the Democratic Republic of 
the Congo being classified as an independent 
float regime. Thus, the scope for monetary 
policy to make an active contribution to fighting 
inflationary pressures is limited.
The dominance of pegs and tightly managed 
floats implies that central banks are likely to 
continue intervening in foreign exchange 
markets, counteracting appreciation pressures. 
Moreover, even though capital account 
liberalisation has not been completed in the 
region, the uncovered interest rate parity 
condition sets tight limits on an expansion of 
sterilisation efforts, with significant implications 
for (rising) domestic interest rates. In addition, 
central banks will aim to avoid sterilisation 
losses, which – given the importance of foreign 
exchange reserves to central bank balance 
sheets – would immediately be felt in the profit 
and loss account. 
Substantial excess reserves of commercial 
banks indicate that financial sector development 
in many WCA countries represents an additional 
challenge that needs to be met in order to 
channel capital inflows to productive uses. 
However, this is a medium-term, structural 
challenge, as it focuses as much on the quality 
as on the quantity of financial intermediation. 
Indeed, a purely quantitative increase in 
financial development, e.g. a rise in the private 
sector credit to GDP ratio, would be 
counterproductive if it represented unsound 
lending practices. A credit-based expansion of 
domestic demand would actually increase 
inflationary pressures if borrowers did not make 
productive use of the funds. 
Taking current exchange rate regimes as given, 
fiscal policy will continue to bear most of the 
burden of ensuring sustainable, non-inflationary 
growth. While fiscal policies have been prudent 
overall in many WCA countries in recent years, 
further progress – including the establishment 
and proper functioning of oil stabilisation and 
savings funds or fiscal rules – would seem to be 
needed to cope with the cyclical and structural 
policy challenges posed by high commodity 
prices. Indeed, given the current level of oil 
prices and other commodity prices and the 
associated capital inflows, even higher surpluses 
and/or lower deficits might be needed to 
maintain macroeconomic stability. Moreover, 
they would facilitate any adjustment process in 
the event of a pronounced decline in commodity 
prices. 
In structural terms, given the uncertainty 
surrounding the character of a commodity price 
shock, in particular whether it is temporary or 
permanent, fiscal policy is called upon to 
support, via targeted spending, the ability of 
economies to diversify away from oil and 
other dominant commodities. Alternatively, 
government savings, e.g. based on an explicit 
fiscal rule and/or a savings fund, would dampen 
cyclical demand pressures and address long-
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ANNEX
Table A1 Effective statutory minimum reserves requirements
(reserve requirements as a percentage of total deposits) 
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Benin 1.3 1.4 1.1 3.1 2.8 5.7 8.9 12.7 14.6 18.3 21.1 22.1
Burkina Faso 1.3 1.4 1.6 4.4 3.2 3.2 3.4 4.3 4.5 4.3 7.7 10.6
Cameroon 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.7 3.0 6.7 6.6 6.6 6.7
Cape Verde n.a. 18.0 18.0 18.0 18.0 18.0 18.0 18.0 19.0 18.0 17.5 17.0
Central African 
Republic 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.7 2.1 2.1 0.0 n.a. n.a.
Chad 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.8 2.3 4.7 4.6 4.6 4.6
Congo 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.8 3.4 7.2 7.1 7.2 7.4
Côte d’Ivoire 1.7 1.8 1.8 4.1 1.8 3.3 3.7 3.8 3.7 6.1 6.3 6.1
Democratic 
Republic of the 
Congo 1.6 1.6 1.7 n.a. n.a. n.a. 1.8 1.8 2.2 2.3 n.a. n.a.
Equatorial Guinea 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.8 3.3 7.1 7.3 7.3 8.1
Gabon 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.7 1.9 3.9 4.0 6.8 6.8
The Gambia 13.5 13.2 13.2 17.2 17.1 17.2 17.0 17.5 16.5 18.0 16.4 14.9
Ghana 5.0 8.0 8.0 8.0 8.0 8.0 8.0 9.0 9.0 9.0 9.0 9.0
Guinea 8.6 5.5 1.2 1.2 1.2 2.4 5.9 5.9 5.9 5.9 n.a. n.a.
Guinea-Bissau 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.4 4.1 4.7 3.5 4.1 5.2 5.2 4.9 5.4
Liberia n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 38.8 53.4 64.2 63.2 51.8 n.a. n.a.
Mali 1.6 1.8 1.9 4.8 4.2 4.1 4.0 11.5 13.1 12.7 14.6 14.2
Mauretania n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
Niger 1.4 1.4 1.6 4.1 1.8 4.6 6.1 7.2 7.4 7.3 10.7 14.0
Nigeria 6.1 8.2 8.3 8.3 13.1 12.8 13.3 12.3 10.0 9.7 n.a. n.a.
São Tomé and 
Príncipe n.a. n.a. 22.0 22.0 22.0 22.0 22.0 22.0 22.0 22.0 24.5 n.a.
Senegal 1.6 1.6 1.5 2.5 1.5 5.5 9.9 11.0 11.7 11.3 11.4 11.7
Sierra Leone 11.0 10.9 10.9 10.6 11.4 11.5 11.1 11.3 11.1 11.0 n.a. n.a.
Togo 1.5 1.6 1.5 4.5 1.7 2.9 3.1 3.7 3.8 3.8 3.8 3.6
Sources: IMF, Saxegaard (2006), national sources and ECB calculations.
Note: Effective minimum reserve ratios are calculated as the average of the statutory minimum reserve requirement ratios on demand 
deposits and on savings and time deposits, weighted by the actual respective deposits.       35
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Chart A1 a) Demand components, non-agricultural commodity exporters
(indices of total real demand, real GDP)
Sources: IMF and ECB calculations. 
Note: Data for 2006 are estimates.
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Chart A1 b) Demand components, agricultural commodity exporters (1)
(indices of total real demand, real GDP)
Sources: IMF and ECB calculations. 
Note: Data for Liberia are not available. Data for 2006 are estimates. 
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Chart A1 c) Demand components, agricultural commodity exporters (2) 
(indices of total real demand, real GDP)
Sources: IMF and ECB calculations. 
Note: Data for Liberia are not available. Data for 2006 are estimates. 
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
government spending (left-hand scale)
private investment (left-hand scale)



















































































Occasional Paper No 60
April 2007
Chart A2 a) Government balance, non-agricultural commodity exporters
(balance as a percentage of GDP; commodity price indices, 1995 = 100)
Sources: IMF and ECB calculations. 
Note: Data for 2006 are estimates.
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Chart A2 b) Government balance, agricultural commodity exporters (1)
(balance as a percentage of GDP; commodity price indices, 1995 = 100)
Sources: IMF and ECB calculations.
Note: Commodity price data for Cape Verde and Senegal are not available; data for 2006 are estimates.
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Chart A2 c) Government balance, agricultural commodity exporters (2)
(balance as a percentage of GDP; commodity price indices, 1995 = 100)
Sources: IMF and ECB calculations.
Note: São Tomé and Príncipe received signatuer bonuses and interest oil proceeds amounting to 75% of GDP (2005) and 78% of GDP 
(2006); data for 2006 are estimates.      
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Chart A3 Output gaps, oil exporters
(cyclical component as a percentage of GDP)
Sources: IMF and ECB calculations.
Note: The output gaps equal the cyclical GDP components, derived by applying the Baxter-King band-pass filter and expressed as a 
percentage of GDP. The underlying data period stretches from 1980 to 2008 (estimates for 2006-2008). Due to the three-year lead/lag 
structure of the filter, three years are cut off at both ends of the sample.       
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Chart A4 a) Foreign reserves, oil exporters
(reserves in USD billions; oil price index, 1995 = 100)
Source: IMF.
Note: Stocks of total reserves minus gold. 
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Chart A4 b) Foreign reserves, non-agricultural exporters
(reserves in USD billions; commodity price index, 1995 = 100)
Sources: IMF and ECB calculations.
Note: Stocks of total reserves minus gold; no data are available for DR Congo since 1997 and for Mauritania since 2004. 
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Chart A4 c) Foreign reserves, agricultural commodity exporters (1)
(reserves in USD billions; commodity price index, 1995 = 100)
Sources: IMF and ECB calculations.
Note: Stocks of total reserves minus gold, commodity price data for Cape Verde and Senegal are not available. 
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Chart A4 d) Foreign reserves, agricultural commodity exporters (2)
(reserves in USD billions; commodity price index, 1995 = 100)
Source: IMF and ECB calculations.
Note: Stocks of total reserves minus gold. 
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Chart A5 a) Excess liquidity, non-agricultural commodity exporters
(percentages of total bank deposits, price index, 1995 = 100)
Sources: IMF, Saxegaard (2006), national sources and ECB calculations. 
Note: Data are unavailable for DR Congo (1998-2000) and Mauritania.
effective reserve requirement (left-hand scale)
excess reserves (left-hand scale)
commodity price (right-hand scale)
Central African Republic (Diamonds)



















effective reserve requirement (left-hand scale)
excess reserves (left-hand scale)
commodity price (right-hand scale)
oil price (right-hand scale)
DR Congo (Diamonds, oil)



















effective reserve requirement (left-hand scale)
excess reserves (left-hand scale)
commodity price (right-hand scale)
Sierra Leone (Diamonds)



















effective reserve requirement (left-hand scale)
excess reserves (left-hand scale)
commodity price (right-hand scale)
Guinea (Aluminium)



















effective reserve requirement (left-hand scale)
excess reserves (left-hand scale)
commodity price (right-hand scale)
oil price (right-hand scale)
Mauritania (Iron ore; oil since 2006)



















effective reserve requirement (left-hand scale)
excess reserves (left-hand scale)
commodity price (right-hand scale)
Niger (Uranium)




















Occasional Paper No 60
April 2007
Chart A5 b) Excess liquidity, agricultural commodity exporters (1)
(percentage of total bank deposits, price index, 1995 = 100)
Sources: IMF, Saxegaard (2006), national sources and ECB calculations. 
Note: Commodity prices data for Cape Verde and Senegal are not available. 
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Chart A5 c) Excess liquidity, agricultural commodity exporters (2)
(percent of total bank deposits, price index, 1995 = 100)
Sources: IMF, Saxegaard (2006), national sources and ECB calculations.
Note: Liquidity data are unavailable for Liberia before 2000 and for São Tomé & Príncipe before 1997. 
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